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Violence is a common feature of family life in the United States, but 
it has received little attention from the criminal justice system. Since 
women are the primary victims of such violence, some observers have 
argued that this inattention represents yet another form of discrimination 
against women, or is at least protective of traditional values concerning 
marriage and the family. For example, Martin (1976, p. 88) states “The 
sanctity of the family home pervades the world of law enforcement.” 
In a similar vein, Roy (1977, p. 138) argues that “underlying the criminal 
justice system is the covert toleration of wifebeating, as indicated in the 
policy and personal attitudes of the police, prosecutors, and judges; and 
through the inefficient procedures which render even the existing legal 
remedies inadequate.” These and similar criticisms generally treat the 
police, prosecutors, and judges as administrators of justice who, in cases 
of wife assault, fail to do their jobs. 
One can see how a cycle of inattention could exist in the criminal 
justice system without resort to explanations based on misogynist individual 
attitudes or patriarchical organizational goals, or to claims of inefficiency 
and indolence. At the very least, police may be reluctant to arrest batterers 
or enforce court orders because of nonsupport from prosecutors and 
judges, and without the exercise of police discretion, cases of domestic 
violence cannot come to the attention of the courts. Under these cir- 
cumstances, few cases would be prosecuted, thus further reinforcing 
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police disinterest (see Cole, 1970, for a general account of police-prosecutor 
relations, and Berk, Loseke, Berk, and Rauma, 1980, and Berk, Rauma, 
Loseke, and Berk, 1982, for an account related to domestic violence 
cases). 
However, that is not necessarily the whole story. As Bittner (1980, 
p. 125) has pointed out, law enforcement-or the application of legal 
rules to particular situations-is something that the police do with a 
frequency “located somewhere between virtually never and very rarely.” 
Instead, police handle situations as they come up, with the criminal code 
serving as a set of boundaries for appropriate action and, perhaps more 
importantly, as a later set of justifications for the actions that they have 
taken. Furthermore, Bittner suggests that police are seldom concerned 
with more than a fraction of defined offenses: those offenses for which 
it is clear that the offender needs to be caught and physical force will 
likely be necessary in order to do so. In line with this, Berk and Loseke 
(1980) have argued that police arrest decisions in cases of wife assault 
appear to be determined by the need to deal with the volatility of the 
immediate situation, especially the possibility of further violence (see 
also Worden and Pollitz, 1984). Discretionary decision making in instances 
of wife assault, seen by some as inefficiency or discrimination, is perhaps 
reflective more of police work generally than of incompetence or other, 
more sinister agendas. 
Even if police are dealing with domestic violence in ways consistent 
with the rest of their work, there remains the possibility that prosecutors 
are a source of differential treatment for wife batterers. The statements 
cited earlier point to a pervasive attitude that prosecutors presumably 
share in. Certainly critics of plea bargaining (e.g., National Advisory 
Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, 1973) have claimed 
that prosecutors’ negotiations with defendants amount to unnecessary 
leniency and undermine the entire judicial process. However, discussions 
of prosecutors’ work bear striking similarities to descriptions of police 
work, and suggest that, given their authority to use discretion, prosecutors 
likewise deal with situations in which the legal code serves as both a 
delimiter and a resource. In this paper, I will examine how prosecutors 
make decisions, by analyzing data from one prosecutor’s office in order 
to better understand how prosecution decisions are made in cases of 
wife assault. 
In an attempt to address the problem of criminal justice system inattention 
to domestic violence, a unique project was developed in Santa Barbara, 
California. Funded largely by the Law Enforcement Assistance Agency 
(LEAA), the project had the goal of improving the attention to spousal 
abuse cases at various levels of the system. Among the various programs 
were educational efforts with the police, to increase their understanding 
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of domestic violence generally and of the need to document such cases 
adequately, and a special effort within the District Attorney’s office to 
divert certain offenders into counseling as an alternative to prosecution 
for spousal assault. The stated aim of the diversion program was simple: 
in cases normally classified by the District Attorney as less severe (e.g., 
misdemeanors)’ und when offenders had no prior record of assault, a 
criminal record and the possibility of jail time could be “exchanged” 
for attendance in a counseling program. 
Earlier papers have discussed in detail the workings of the Santa 
Barbara Family Violence Program (Berk, Berk, and Loseke, 1979) and 
the efforts at changing the handling of domestic violence cases by the 
police and the District Attorney’s office (Berk et al., 1980; Berk et al., 
1982). Here, I will focus on the workings of the District Attorney’s office 
during the height of the Family Violence Program (FVP), before LEAA 
funding was reduced, resulting in program reduction. Using a sample of 
199 domestic incidents forwarded to the District Attorney’s office during 
this time, I will look at the three initial steps toward prosecution: (1) 
the decision whether or not to follow up an incident (i.e., collect more 
information and evidence), (2) the decision whether or not to take a case 
to arraignment, and (3) the decision whether or not to use the diversion 
option, given that a case could be arraigned. 
Specifically, the issues addressed in this paper are both substantive 
and methodological. First, I will consider what factors affected the decision- 
making process at each step, given a committed Deputy District Attorney 
(DDA) and a mandate to actively pursue family violence cases, but also 
given organizational requirements such as evidence and the formal criteria 
for diversion. Critics have raised the issue of inefficient and perhaps 
discriminatory behavior on the part of criminal justice officials in cases 
of wife assault. My aim is to first consider how decisions are made, and 
only later will I consider the possibility that the use of certain “extra- 
legal” factors constitutes discriminatory behavior. For the analyses pre- 
sented herein, I will not consider extra-legal to be “synonymous with 
‘illegal,’ ‘ inappropriate,’ or ‘socially unjust’ ” (Nagel, 1983, p. 482). 
A second issue ‘concerns whether or not the diversion program was 
used as designed. Informal evidence suggests not, and I will be able to 
formally investigate that stage in the process leading ultimately to 
prosecution. 
Finally, I will be concerned with the issue of sample selection bias. 
The criminal justice system is typically described as a “funnel,” where 
at each step additional cases are dropped, presumably in a systematic 
manner. The three decision steps make possible analysis strategies that 
’ Generally, I will use the terms serious/severe and not serious/not severe to refer to 
felonies and misdemeanors, respectively. 
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explicitly take into account this funneling process and the sample selection 
problem that it presents. The problem and possible remedies will be 
discussed in detail later. 
THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE 
Background: The Family Violence Project 
In brief, the DA component of the Family Violence Project (FVP) had 
four goals: (1) to encourage the police to report all domestic violence 
cases that came to their attention, (2) to encourage the police to properly 
document those incidents in order to facilitate possible prosecution, (3) 
to increase the number of offenders sanctioned, and (4) to make available 
a form of diversion into counseling as an alternative for less serious 
incidents of violence (for a more complete description of the program, 
see Berk et al., 1979). 
The FVP began operation in November 1978, with the assignment of 
a full-time DDA to the exclusive handling of domestic violence cases. 
With the help of a full-time criminal investigator, the DDA was to prosecute 
such cases more aggressively and to make use of a diversion option for 
less serious offenses. Educational efforts were also begun with the police, 
to instruct them in the proper documentation of domestic violence calls. 
The police were specifically encouraged to report such calls as domestic 
cases rather than, for example, disturbing the peace. The rationale was 
simple: with proper documentation, the DDA could in principle take 
further action leading to prosecution or diversion, and with support of 
their own actions through increased prosecutorial attention and action, 
the police would be further encouraged to take domestic calls seriously. 
Using weekly time series data for the police and the District Attorney’s 
office, other analyses have demonstrated how the FVP improved police 
reporting practices as well as increased the number of offenders held 
accountable by the District Attorney, at least while special attention was 
paid to making those changes work (Berk et al., 1980; Berk et al., 1982). 
Once that attention lagged, in part because LEAA funding was reduced 
and because of personnel turnover and reorganization in the District 
Attorney’s office, the system effectively returned to its previous state 
(Berk et af., 1982). 
The Diversion Program 
According to the Santa Barbara County District Attorney’s Family 
Violence Prosecution Manual, “The purpose of diversion is to hold of- 
fenders accountable for their conduct while allowing those who wish to 
prove themselves and avoid conviction the opportunity to attend counseling 
and educational sessions.” The Santa Barbara program was intended as 
a legitimate alternative to prosecution for individuals who could be and 
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ordinarily would be prosecuted. Therefore, the decision to divert was 
to be made after the decision was made to file charges against the suspect. 
Diversion could be allowed, at the prosecutor’s discretion, under these 
circumstances: 
1. the offender had never been convicted of a domestic violence offense, 
2. the offender had no significant criminal record, 
3. the injuries to the victim were not serious, 
4. the offender seemed sufficiently responsible, indicating a reasonable 
likelihood of completing the diversion program, 
5. the offender desired diversion, and 
6. the victim had no reasonable objections to diversion. 
A minimum of 1 year of participation in the diversion program was 
required, and it could be longer. If at the end of the diversion period, 
the offender had successfully completed the requirements of the counseling 
program and had been involved in no further violence against anyone, 
the original charges would be dismissed. If, however, at any time the 
offender did not participate in the program or commited some violent 
act, the case would be brought to court and prosecution would commence. 
The Process Leading to Diversion 
As noted above, the diversion step is the third decision made by the 
DDA, at least for cases that reach that level. At the first step, cases are 
forwarded to the District Attorney’s office from police departments 
throughout Santa Barbara County. Documentation of these cases may 
take one of three forms: field cards, with minimal information reflecting 
minimal contact with citizens; incident reports (i.e., case sheets or offense 
reports), reflecting more prolonged contact and which are likely to contain 
more information than field cards; and arrest reports, which generally 
contain the greatest documentation of the incident. 
Among the reports forwarded by the police, the DDA screens out 
cases for possible prosecution. Very often, a criminal investigator will 
be sent out to gather more information, in particular if there was no 
arrest and therefore only a field card or an incident report was filled out 
(ordinarily, because of the lack of information, incidents recorded on 
field cards are discarded by the DDA). 
Once the DDA has decided to follow up a case, perhaps by collecting 
more information, the next decision is whether or not to arraign the 
offender (including what charges are to be filed, if any). Only after this 
decision, to arraign or not, is the decision made about possible diversion. 
The DDA may recommend diversion rather than prosecution. However, 
if the offender is unwilling to accept diversion, prosecution will proceed 
(it is also possible that the offender will be diverted after arraignment, 
but I will not be concerned with that outcome here). In principle, the 
steps leading to diversion differ from the diversion decision only in that 
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the decision to divert is to be based solely on characteristics of the 
offender and the offense. Evidentiary matters have presumably already 
been considered. 
The question that can now be raised concern what factors affect the 
sequential selection of cases? Of course there are legal requirements 
such as the strength of evidence, but the relevant literature on prosecutorial 
decision making suggests that other legal and “extra-legal” factors also 
play a role. There is also a good deal of anecdotal evidence that domestic 
violence cases are often not given serious consideration. In the next 
section I will explore these issues, as well as specify a model of how 
these decisions might be made. 
SPECIFYING A MODEL 
Prosecutorial Decision Making 
With few exceptions, the handling of family violence by the criminal 
justice system has not been addressed in any systematic fashion. Evidence 
concerning the behavior of prosecutors and judges is largely anecdotal 
(e.g., Martin, 1976; Dobash and Dobash, 1979). For example, much is 
usually made of the fact that few domestic offenders are ever prosecuted, 
let alone convicted of assault or other personal violence crimes. However, 
it is equally true that few assault cases are prosecuted and prosecuted 
successfully. For instance, the Vera Institute study of felony arrests in 
New York City shows that “a defendant who enters the criminal process 
charged with a felony assault is less likely to be convicted than defendants 
entering the process on other felony charges” (Vera Institute of Justice, 
1977, p. 24). Of the 369 felony assault cases in the Vera Institute sample, 
only 18% entered the criminal process, and of these cases, almost half 
were dismissed altogether. Only 10% of the original 369 cases were ever 
decided, and most by pleas to lesser charges than by trial.2 Without 
research explicitly comparing the processing of domestic violence offenses 
with that of other types of offenses, claims that domestic violence cases 
are treated in some systematically different fashion are merely claims. 
But what factors are important in that decision making process? I will 
argue that one cannot simply assume that broad goals (such as the defense 
of patriarchy) or misogynist attitudes motivate the behavior of criminal 
justice actors. Rather, their actions must first be understood within the 
context of the organization they are a part of. Reiss (1971, pp. 114-120) 
suggests that the criminal justice system is a “loosely articulated hierarchy 
of.. . subsystems,” and consequently that “each subsystem creates its 
own system ofjustice” [emphasis in original]. Within this view, overarching 
’ Of the 67 cases that went to court, 46% involved individuals with a prior relationship, 
and of these cases less than half could be called domestic incidents. However, the numbers 
are too small to make any generalizations from. 
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goals such as the defense of the family home are virtually impossible to 
comprehend without an understanding of how those goals become ar- 
ticulated in the behavior of individual actors at various levels of the 
system. The Vera Institute findings are consistent with this view, that 
the criminal justice system is a loosely coupled system whose components 
respond to one another but which lacks a comprehensive set of rules 
and a single notion of justice (Reiss, 1971; Weick, 1976; Hagan, Hewitt, 
and Alwin, 1979). Analyses of the Family Violence Program generally 
suggest a similar story; without maintained vigilance, coordination between 
the police and the prosecutor can deteriorate rapidly (Berk et al., 1980; 
Berk et al., 1982). 
Overall, there is a vast literature describing the processing of individuals 
through the criminal justice system: from studies of police discretion 
(e.g., Bittner, 1967, 1980; Johnson, Petersen, and Wells, 1977; S. F. Berk 
and Loseke, 1980; Grant, Grant, and Tech, 1982; Visher, 1983; Smith, 
1984), decision making within the prosecutor’s office (e.g., Hall, 1975; 
Williams, 1976; Heumann, 1977; Myers and Hagan, 1979; Stanko, 1982), 
to sentencing decisions (e.g., Hagan, Nagel, and Albonetti, 1980; Kleck, 
1981; Brereton and Caspar, 1982; Wheeler, Weisburd, and Bode, 1982; 
Peterson and Hagan, 1984). Throughout this literature are references to 
various factors that, taken together, point to specific concerns underlying 
prosecutorial decisions that are similar to those described by Bittner as 
underlying police work. 
That prosecutors are concerned with making good cases is a truism, 
but it is also an oversimplification. In the context of a bureaucratic 
organization, a variety of demands may be made on prosecutors: or- 
ganizational requirements such as for quick and successful resolution of 
cases, as well as imperatives to satisfy legal prescripts, both procedural 
and evidentiary. Caseload pressures may prompt an increased concern 
for efficiency on the part of prosecutors, and both judges and the public 
may demand effectiveness, the former from a legal and an organizational 
perspective and the latter from a desire for “just desserts.” While Heumann 
(1977) argues that caseload pressures have been exaggerated, especially 
in the higher courts, others such as Cole (1970) and Myers and Hagan 
(1979) have identified them as a real constraint on the efforts of prosecutors 
and as a real incentive to either drop cases or to plea bargain. Added 
to caseload pressures-resulting in part from the time needed to take a 
case to trial-are the risks of taking a case to trial, which affect both 
defense and prosecution attorneys. Guilty pleas to lesser charges may 
be a solution acceptable to all sides. As Newman (1956, p. 788) has 
pointed out 
the accused, directly or through his attorney, offered to plead guilty to the offense 
for which he was arrested, providing it was reduced in kind or in degree, or in 
exchange for a given type or length of sentence. The prosecutor benefitted from 
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such a bargain in that he was assured of a conviction, yet did not have to spend 
the time and effort to prepare a case trial. He also avoided the everpresent risk 
of losing even a clear-cut case should the accused have gone before a jury. The 
court, too, benefitted. Court calenders were, and are, crowded and the entire 
court system would admittedly be inadequate to cope with criminal trials should 
all. or even a fraction of the felony arrests decide to go to trial. This, coupled 
with the generally favorable attitude toward bargaining processes on the part of 
the lawyers, civil and criminal, in the local bar, made informal methods of conviction 
almost inevitable. 
These pressures, whether inevitable or not, have produced much more 
informal means of deciding cases through the plea bargaining process. 
As Mather (1974) suggests, plea bargaining allows attorneys on both 
sides to emphasize mitigating circumstances that could ultimately affect 
sentencing but which would be inadmissable during a trial to decide guilt 
or innocence. Evidence remains crucial, of course, but weaknesses there 
can only add to the pressures to bargain. These mitigating or “extralegal” 
circumstances seem to center around the character of the defendant 
(including not only the past record, but the likely future behavior of the 
defendant as well), the seriousness of the offense, the appropriate pun- 
ishment for that offense (and that offender), and the character of the 
victim. Underlying these considerations is an assumption that the defendant 
did something worthy of punishment, or at least worthy of attention by 
authorities; according to Sudnow (1964, p. 271) the defendant’s guilt “is 
not attended to.” Similar to police interventions, prosecutor intervention 
is apparently motivated by a perceived need to exercise their own legal 
solutions to particular situations. Whereas the police can use force when 
warranted, prosecutors can file charges and therefore make private troubles 
a matter of public concern (Myers and Hagan, 1979). 
Character assessments appear to be crucial to prosecutors’ decisions 
about further action. Littrell (1979), for example, gives accounts of how 
rap sheets can be used by prosecutors in order to construct a character 
profile for a defendant: is this person of “sinister” character? Character 
assessments can affect how serious the offense is deemed to be, whether 
the defendant is viewed as likely to do more of the same, or worse, and 
what the just desserts are. Stank0 (1982) discusses the role of victim 
and the victim’s character in prosecutors’ decision making. Whether or 
not the victim can stand up in court and testify and be believed is crucial 
to the disposition of the case, especially in personal violence cases. 
Credibility is damaged if the victim is of suspect character, and may be 
quickly lost if the victim is seen as a willing or even an active participant 
in the offense. Sudnow’s (1964) concept of a normal crime gets at the 
same process, but also includes various other elements such as offense 
seriousness, type of victim (and implicitly something about character), 
past and future misbehavior, and appropriate sanctions. Similar to the 
GOING FOR THE GOLD 329 
police, prosecutors appear to use their various options when those options 
seem the best or perhaps the only recourse. 
Myers and Hagan (1979), in discussing how prosecutors assess cases, 
go further and suggest that typifications are used, based on general char- 
acteristics of what constitute good and bad cases. According to Myers 
and Hagan (1979, p. 440), good or “strong” cases are described in legally 
relevant terms because their strength lies in their ability to be successfully 
prosecuted. Victims who are likely to be good witnesses will be described 
in terms of their credibility as witnesses, rather than in terms of their 
credibility as victims. Thus, even extra-legal criteria are given a legal 
interpretation as a justification for relying on them. Unfortunately, “strong” 
cases are defined along a large number of dimensions, including those 
listed above, and are consequently seldom encountered. The typical or 
in Sudnow’s terms, “normal” crime makes a bad case. Decisions about 
cases, particularly in the early stages, are decisions about allocating 
resources, and standards based on “strong case typifications” (Myers 
and Hagan, 1979, p. 440) allow prosecutors to make decisions about the 
likelihood of a successful conviction. If they are to be used efficiently, 
resources must be allocated to good cases, but also to bad cases, when 
such cases warrant attention. 
Within this behavioral framework, one can begin to see how the pro- 
cessing of domestic violence cases could be seen by an observer as 
discriminatory. The lore surrounding such cases is that victims, who are 
often the only witnesses, are typically reluctant to cooperate with pros- 
ecutors. Injuries are difficult to document without a hospital report, and 
if there has been a history of violence, victims may be viewed by judges 
and juries as less credible for having remained in a violent relationship 
for any period of time. Given the expected low probability of conviction, 
the continued allocation of resources to such cases may be difficult to 
rationalize. Consider this statement by a Deputy District Attorney in 
Santa Barbara: 
It’s like I had ten pounds of gold and ten pounds of lead and could only take 
one of them. You take the gold. Domestics are like lead, other cases are like 
gold-they’re easier, they don’t take as much time, they’re worth more. 
Thus, one goal of the Santa Barbara Family Violence Project was to 
make an alchemist’s dream come true. 
A Random Utility Approach to the Screening Process 
From these descriptions of prosecutor decision making, one can move 
to a random utility formulation in order to model screening decisions 
made within the prosecutor’s office (Lute and Raiffa, 1957; Hey, 1979). 
The prosecutor’s utility function will be maximized by selection of cases 
for further action that meet legal criteria for a good case (e.g., solid 
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evidence), which have other desirable characteristics (e.g., a credible 
victim or witness who would be convincing to a judge and/or jury, or 
an offender “in need” of punishment), and which are of sufficient se- 
riousness (e.g., the offender seriously injured the victim) to warrant 
prosecution. Put a bit differently, the systematic component of the utility 
function is composed of characteristics of the case that correspond to 
legal criteria, characteristics of the case that correspond to “extralegal” 
criteria, organizational requirements within the prosecutor’s office, any 
other characteristics that might affect the case’s later disposition, and 
offenders’ “just desserts.” The concept of case typification, as variously 
described by Sudnow and by Myers and Hagan, suggests that this sys- 
tematic component is formed largely by comparisons of the offender, 
the offense, and the desirable outcome to more general notions of what 
each should look like (and has looked like) in similar and dissimilar sorts 
of cases. While formal legal criteria are important, one would not expect 
them to necessarily dominate the utility function, since at these stages 
mitigating circumstances are explicitly taken into account. And because 
the final outcome is uncertain, decision makers are assumed to be capable 
of assigning probabilities to the possible outcomes. At any given stage, 
whether initial screening, which charges to file, and what type of bargain 
to strike, decision makers will choose the line of action (dismissal or 
further processing) that yields the highest expected utility. Therefore, 
the random utility model for prosecutors’ decision making explicitly states 
that decisions to further prosecute (and perhaps to plea bargain) are 
made on the basis of legal and “extralegal” criteria, plus a random 
component. 
It is important to stress that this definition of utility maximization is 
not synonymous with a high conviction rate specifically, nor with bu- 
reaucratic efficiency generally, since prosecutors are also concerned with 
other issues concerning the crime, the offender, the victim, and the 
community. The Santa Barbara County District Attorney’s Family Violence 
Prosecution Manual stresses that the victim as well as the case is to be 
protected, and that probation is a desirable alternative “indicating a 
second chance for the offender.” Yet, it is nevertheless true that efficiency 
in screening cases is an organizational requirement that is typically defined 
by quick resolution of cases as well as a high conviction rate (Stanko, 
1982; Myers and Hagan, 1979; Rosett and Cressey, 1976, p. 135). 
A Model for the Santa Barbara Diversion Program 
With the random utility model in hand, I can begin to specify what 
case factors could determine the utility of further processing by the Santa 
Barbara District Attorney’s office, perhaps leading to diversion or outright 
dismissal. Unfortunately, I have no data on other, nondomestic cases 
processed during this period, and consequently I cannot compare the 
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processing of various types of cases. Nor are there a sufficient number 
of cases handled before the start of the Family Violence Program with 
which to make pre- and postintervention comparisons. Two legitimate 
questions that cannot be addressed are did the processing of domestic 
violence cases change with the advent of the Family Violence Program, 
and are there differences between the processing of such cases and other 
personal violence cases? 
The questions that can’be asked are important nevertheless. First, was 
the diversion program used as intended? There were specific criteria 
defining the eligibility of offenders for the program, but conversations 
with individuals close to the process have suggested that the program 
may have been used for other purposes, such as an alternative sanction 
for serious cases with a low probability of conviction. 
Second, how were cases of wife assault selected for possible prosecution 
or diversion? The amount of evidence and the number of witnesses should 
have a bearing on these decisions. It is also very likely that the DDA, 
in the course of her work, employed standardized accounts of what the 
“usual” case of spousal assault looks like, and who and what the victim 
and the offender in this case “usually” are. In other words, simply as 
an organizational requirement, the DDA would use typifications of one 
sort or another in order to readily deal with individual cases, through 
comparison to other sorts of cases. As a consequence, other factors, 
such as characteristics of the victim and the offender and their behavior, 
should also affect the decision-making process. Despite the mandate to 
pursue domestic cases more actively, the Deputy District Attorney was 
still accountable for her actions. “Weak” cases might still be dismissed 
later on in the process, perhaps after some expenditure of resources, 
and regardless of the outcome, decisions would have to be justifiable to 
superiors and, at some point, to a judge. If such schema were employed, 
one would expect to find that nonlegal characteristics affect decisions at 
each of the three decision points, and assuming that typifications were 
consistently used, I will attempt to specify identical models at all three 
stages, but will include new information in the models as it becomes 
available at later stages (e.g., new evidence). 
THE DATA AND SOME STATISTICAL ISSUES 
The Sample 
The data set I will use consists of 199 domestic incidents forwarded 
to the Santa Barbara County District Attorney’s office after the estab- 
lishment of the special Deputy District Attorney’s office and the start 
of the diversion program. Only cases recorded on incident or arrest 
reports are included. Furthermore, “domestic” incidents are defined as 
involving two adults in a past or present heterosexual romantic or conjugal 
relationship. And for the sake of conceptual clarity, only cases with a 
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female victim and a male offender are included. The prosecution program 
was intended primarily for male offenders, as was the diversion alternative. 
Furthermore, the literature on domestic violence identifies this situation 
as somehow special in the eyes of the authorities. (For a full description 
of how the sample was collected and what it contains, see S. F. Berk 
and Loseke, 1980. Note that the sample used by Berk and Loseke contained 
262 cases; I have dropped 63 cases that were forwarded before the 
diversion program became an option.) 
The three decision points-to follow up a case, to file charges, and to 
divert-are represented by three dummy variables. Each dummy variable 
is coded 1 if the decision was positive (e.g., to divert a case). Furthermore, 
since the decisions are made sequentially and cases drop out of the 
system at each point, the sample size will be smaller at each step. For 
the initial decision to follow up a case, the sample consists of 199 cases. 
Of these 199 cases, the 96 cases that were followed up constitute the 
sample for the decision about arraignment. Finally, of these remaining 
96 cases, the 75 cases that could be arraigned (as decided by the DDA) 
are the sample for the decision about possible diversion. The three discrete 
outcome measures and the sequential selection of cases pose several 
statistical and estimation problems that I will consider shortly. 
One issue that I will not address concerns the charges that were actually 
filed or could have been filed had a case not been diverted. Unless an 
offender refused diversion, or violated the terms of the counseling program, 
what charges would have been filed are unknown.3 One cannot assume 
that diverted cases were solely misdemeanors, since some diverted cases 
that were later arraigned were arraigned on felony charges (which suggests 
that diversion was in some instances a bargaining tool). Furthermore, 
the charges filed may not represent the actual offense, but may instead 
represent overcharging as a first step in a plea bargaining process. However, 
if there was a larger sample at the diversion stage, I could, in principle, 
extend the analysis one additional step and consider the charges filed 
only when a case is arraigned. 
To model these decisions, I have an array of exogenous variables, 
reflecting amount of evidence, the offender’s prior record, other char- 
acteristics of the offense (such as severity), and characteristics of the 
victim, the offender, and their relationship. Means and standard deviations 
for these variables are presented in Table 1. 
Since these are cases coded from official records, I stress that the 
information becomes more complete as the case proceeds farther along 
in the system. Incident reports, for example, contain whatever the police 
’ In principle, one could model the charges filed, and take account of the censoring 
caused by the diversion option. I chose not to, largely because I am interested in how 
offenders are selected for further processing, and not what charges are filed against them. 
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decide to note about the incident. Similarly, arrest reports may contain 
omissions. For example, if, in an incident report, the police fail to note 
the number of witnesses, it is impossible to distinguish that situation 
from no witnesses unless the DDA decides to follow up on the case and, 
at the subsequent decision stage, more information is gathered. However, 
for my purposes, this apparent measurement error is no problem because 
I have the same information available to the DDA when she decides the 
fate of a case. What is potentially problematic, but for which there is 
no remedy, are variables that I fail to observe but which are known to 
the DDA. For example, cases that go on to the second decision stage, 
whether or not to file charges in court, may be taken up by the special 
investigator. Information that the investigator comes up with may not 
be recorded in the files, or only recorded in legally relevant terms (e.g., 
a case is dropped because the investigator discovers that the woman first 
attacked the man, but the official reason is lack of evidence). 
In addition to case characteristics, I have one measure of organizational 
constraints placed on the DDA: the number of cases forwarded by the 
police in a given week. Presumably, when more cases are forwarded, 
the DDA may have to be more selective about following up “marginal” 
cases. 
Statistical Issues 
For each of the three discrete dependent variables, I will estimate a 
probit model (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1981, pp. 280-287; Amemiya, 1981; 
Maddala, 1983).4 Consequently, I am assuming that the probability of a 
case being followed up, of a case being arraigned, and of a case being 
diverted each follows a cumulative normal distribution function. Within 
the random utility framework, this is equivalent to saying that the probability 
that one choice has a higher utility is distributed according to the cumulative 
normal.5 
A crucial statistical issue is the problem of sample selection bias. The 
systematic selection of cases at various stages in the criminal justice 
system will be reflected in any sample of cases examined at subsequent 
stages in the system. For example, cases that make it to the diversion 
decision are not necessarily representative of all cases that are forwarded 
to the District Attorney’s office; rather, in all likelihood, they have been 
4 Maximum likelihood estimates were obtained using the LIMDEP program in MIT’s 
TROLL package. As a check, the same models were estimated and identical results 
obtained using a nonlinear least squares program and the method of scoring (Jennrich and 
Moore, 1975). 
’ The random utility model is not necessary in order to estimate either a probit or a 
logit model, since these are merely convenient functional forms. However, the random 
utility model does provide a behavioral foundation for the use of the cumulative normal 
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sampled according to certain criteria such as strength of evidence. Unless 
the decision process at a given step can be specified correctly (i.e., all 
the relevant variables can be included in the estimated model), parameter 
estimates will be biased because earlier selection processes remain con- 
founded with the current decision process (Berk and Ray, 1982; Klepper, 
Nagin, and Tierney, 1983), and both internal and external validity are 
threatened. This funneling process corresponds to incidental sample se- 
lection (Goldberger, 1981; Berk and Ray, 1982), for which Heckman 
(1976, 1980) has derived an intuitively appealing and relatively convenient 
means of handling. 
When a single selection process is at work for a given sample, Heckman’s 
approach can be formulated as a two-equation model. The probability 
that a given observation in the full sample will be in the selected subsample 
is estimated with a probit model, that predicted probability is used to 
construct a hazard rate instrument for the likelihood of not being in the 
subsample, the hazard rate is included as a regressor in an equation for 
the continuous dependent variable of interest, and this substantive equation 
is estimated only for the selected subsample. Heckman’s formulation 
can be thought of as an omitted variable problem, in which the hazard 
rate represents the likelihood of not being in the selected sample, and 
ignoring the hazard rate (i.e., the selection process) results in a specification 
error and all of its attendant consequences. 
My approach will differ from Heckman’s two-equation approach in 
several respects. First, Heckman’s probit model for the selection process 
may be of no substantive interest, or of less substantive interest than 
the equation that follows it. In contrast, all three selection points here 
are substantively important, since each represents a distinct decision 
made by the DDA. Second, I will estimate three equations in which, for 
the second and third equations, the predicted probabilities from the im- 
mediately prior step will be used to construct a hazard rate instrument 
for the current step. Put differently, the model for the decision about 
filing charges will include a hazard rate constructed from the model for 
the follow-up decision, and the model for the decision about diversion 
will include a similarly constructed instrument obtained from the model 
for the filing decision. Note that, as in Heckman’s model, the sample 
size is reduced from one equation to the next, but unlike Heckman’s 
model, I am extending the process to model a sequence of steps (see 
Klepper et al., 1983). 
Finally, where Heckman’s substantive equation has a continuous de- 
pendent variable and can be estimated with ordinary least squares, each 
decision is represented by a discrete dependent variable. The hazard 
rate formulation can be extended to the case of a discrete substantive 
process (e.g., Klepper et ul., 1983), with the caveat that, while the probit 
estimates are maximum likelihood, the problem of heteroscedasticity 
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remains, due to the nature of the hazard rate instrument (Heckman, 
1976, 1980). 
DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS 
My data analysis strategy was twofold: to keep each model simple, 
and to build each equation sequentially rather than begin with a full 
specification. The rationale was that, because of the successively smaller 
samples from decision to decision, the nonlinear and therefore sensitive 
estimation procedures, and the sample selection correction, the equations 
were particularly susceptible to data problems such as lack of variance, 
multicollinearity, and outliers among the regressors. Simplicity seemed 
advisable under the circumstances. Furthermore, in order to better judge 
the sensitivity of the specifications to these types of problems, I began 
with simple models and worked up to believable specifications (see Kim, 
1984, for an alternative and more formal strategy). Since the useful 
graphical diagnostics for OLS regression models are difficult to interpret 
when estimating binary choice models, and alternative diagnostic pro- 
cedures are just now being devised (e.g., Landwehr, F’regibon, and Shoe- 
maker, 1984), this approach seemed a likely way to at least detect gross 
sorts of problems such as high multicollinearity. In the case of each 
model, the final product differed little from what I would have started 
with. I am explicit about the analytic strategy because it was a conscious 
choice, backed up by a theoretical model, and because researchers are 
often less than candid about their attempts to massage the data (Learner, 
1982). Finally, whenever possible, because of a prior expectations, I will 
use the .05 level and one-tailed significance tests for the probit coefficients. 
The Decision to Follow Up an Incident 
The results for the analysis of the first decision, whether or not to 
follow up an incident, are reported in Table 2. The regressors reported 
in Table 2 can be divided into three basic categories: characteristics of 
the principals, features of the incident, and characteristics of the District 
Attorney’s office. 
First of all, if the offender was arrested at the scene, the probability 
of there being further investigation is increased by about 5 and the effect 
is significant at the .05 level for a one-tailed test (I expected a positive 
effect). Multiplying the probit coefficients by .4 gives them a probability 
interpretation at the SO point in the cumulative normal distribution function 
(Amemiya, 1981). In other words, holding all else constant, if the incident 
has a 50-50 chance of being followed up, an arrest at the scene will 
make it a certainty that the case goes to the next stage in the decision 
process. (I will continue to interpret the coefficients at the .5 point in 
the cumulative normal. This is the steepest point in the curve, and 
therefore the changes in the probabilities will be the greatest.) 
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TABLE 2 
A Probit Model for Whether or not an Incident Is Followed up (N = 199) 
Variable Coefficient Asymptotic f value 
Intercept 
The offender was arrested at the 
scene = I (binary) 
Female character: the number of 
negative circumstances (integers) 
Male character: the number of nega- 
tive circumstances (integers) 
The severity of the victim’s injuries 
(integers) 
The offender was injured = 1 
(binary) 
The number of other circumstances 
(integers) 
The victim and the offender are mar- 
ried = 1 (binary) 
The victim and the offender are non- 
white = 1 (binary) 
The number of domestic incidents 
forwarded that week (integers) 






- 1.449 -3.16 
0.325 1.14 
- 0.434 - 1.71 
0.429 1.61 
-0.086 -1.86 
a Calculated with this formula (Maddala, 1983, p. 38): R' = V(p)/V(y), where p is the 
predicted probability from the probit equation, and Y is the dummy dependent variable. 
Two overlapping interpretations are possible for the effect of an on- 
the-scene arrest. First, because an arrest report (as opposed to a field 
card or an incident report) is forwarded to the Deputy District Attorney, 
the incident is likely to be better documented, thus giving the DDA more 
information with which to make a decision. Second, as S. F. Berk and 
Loseke (1980) found when attempting to explain police arrest decisions 
(using this same data set and arrest variable; see Worden and Pollitz, 
1984, for similar results utilizing a different data set), such decisions 
depend as much on situational factors as on occupational or individual 
predispositions. In exercising their most severe option, arrest, the police 
respond to the nature of the event, which itself is likely to be severe. 
These incident characteristics will no doubt be documented in the arrest 
report as a justification for the arrest. Altogether, the adequate docu- 
mentation of a severe incident makes it much more likely that the Deputy 
District Attorney will follow it up. In terms of the random utility model, 
more severe and better documented incidents increase the expected utility 
of further investigation. 
Indicators of male and female character also play a central role in the 
DDA’s decision making. Here, I have constructed character indices, 
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made up of negative circumstances of a given incident (police seldom 
documented positive circumstances). For females, the character index 
is coded 0 if there were no negative circumstances, is coded 1 if either 
the victim was alleged by the offender to have also been violent or she 
was noted by the police to have been drinking, and is coded 2 if the 
victim was alleged to have been violent and noted to have been drinking. 
In the case of males, the character index has a range of 0 to 3, reflecting 
the number of circumstances noted by the police from among the following: 
was there a temporary restraining order in effect against the offender, 
was a weapon present, and was the offender either verbally or physically 
abusive to the police? Note that both indices give equal weight to their 
respective components. Individually, these are relatively infrequent oc- 
currences and I could not represent them with separate dummy variables 
(lack of variance created estimation problems-see Table 1 for the index 
means); nor do I have any theory to dictate the appropriate weighting 
scheme. 
The coefficient for the index of female character shows that for every 
additional negative event, the probability of following up an incident is 
decreased by about .37. The coefficient for males indicates that every 
additional negative circumstance increases the probability of the case 
being followed up by about 5. In each case, the maximum value for the 
index is 2, which represents a decrease of .74 for victims and an increase 
of 1.0 for offenders. Both coefficients are significant at the .05 level for 
a one-tailed test, and both effects are consistent with past research and 
with my a priori expectations. Stanko’s (1982) description of a “stand- 
up witness” is particularly apt here, as is Littrell’s (1979, pp. 137-141) 
description of the defendant’s worthiness for prosecution. Events that 
either raise doubts about the victim as a “victim,” or confirm that the 
offender is guilty of something and deserves attention, affect the DDA’s 
decision about further processing. 
Injuries to either party also affect the DDA’s decision about the incident. 
Injuries to the victim were represented by a severity of injury index 
(which has been described and modeled elsewhere-see Berk et al., 1983 
for details), as a means of gauging the apparent seriousness of the assault. 
The index ranges from 0 (no noted injuries) to 6 (serious injuries, including 
broken bones or teeth and internal injuries), although the highest value 
for the sample is 5 (internal injuries). Every one point increase in the 
severity of injuries to the victim increases the probability of follow up 
by about .26, an effect that is statistically significant for a one-tailed test. 
In contrast, injuries to the offender significantly decrease the probability 
of a case beng followed up by about 58, all other things held constant. 
This variable is coded as a simple dummy variable, unlike the severity 
index of victims, and reflects comments in the police data that the offender 
was either injured or would seek medical attention (the two situations 
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do not always coincide; some offenders were noted as seeking medical 
attention, but no mention was made of injuries). The negative effect 
represents a decrease in the expected utility of a case to the DDA, 
perhaps because it is harder to portray the woman and man as victim 
and offender, respectively, when the man has been injured. Injuries to 
both parties might indicate particularly severe incidents, in which the 
victim inflicted injuries in self-defense, but mutual injufies were noted 
very infrequently. At the same time however, there is informal evidence 
that some offenders’ injuries were self-inflicted, perhaps in the course 
of the violence, or, more likely, because the offender had been drinking 
and/or was physically out of control, and therefore likely to injure himself. 
Recall that the information on the incident and arrest reports is all that 
the DDA has to work with at this point; self-inflicted injuries could only 
be recognized if the police made note of them, or if the case is followed 
up and an investigator later makes that discovery. 
The other measured characteristic of the incident is the number of 
other circumstances mentioned by the police that did not in some manner 
address the issue of individual character: whether or not there was property 
damage and whether or not the police witnessed the violence. Lack of 
variance for the individual components also forced the creation of an 
index which, again, gives equal weight to these circumstances. The coef- 
ficient for the index is not significant at the .05 level for a one-tailed 
test, perhaps because the major factors are already captured in the character 
indices. Lack of variance remains a possible explanation as well. 
The results for other victim and offender traits are mixed. The coefficient 
for a victim and offender who are married (as opposed to divorced, 
separated, or cohabiting) is negative and significant at the .05 level for 
a one-tailed test. I was uncertain about the magnitude of the effect 
because, on the one hand, it may be more difficult to get women to 
cooperate if they are married to the offender (implying a negative coef- 
ficient). On the other hand, since the Deputy District Attorney’s function 
was to prosecute cases of domestic violence, the legal relationship between 
victim and offender should presumably have no bearing on the decision 
to follow up a case (implying a zero coefficient). The effect seems to be 
an indicator of the DDA’s assessment of potential (or typical) problems 
such as victim noncooperation, or possibly of what a desirable outcome 
is for married couples. 
The positive effect for nonwhite couples is troubling, although it is 
not significant at the .05 level for a one-tailed test, because I expected 
a negative coefficient. Originally, I specified the victim’s race, thinking 
that nonwhite victims might be viewed as less credible witnesses (Stanko, 
1982). This implied a negative effect, but the estimated effect was positive. 
As a test, I replaced the victim’s race with the offender’s race, and the 
coefficient was still negative and, in absolute value, slightly larger. As 
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a compromise, I constructed the variable for nonwhite couples, since 
most couples are of the same race, but I am perplexed as to the reason 
for a positive effect. I have left the couple’s race in the equation only 
because the coefficient is virtually identical for the three representations, 
but I do not attribute the positive sign to discrimination, nor can I find 
anything extraordinary about these cases that race serves as a proxy 
for. 
One strong possibility is that the DDA indeed had extra information 
at this stage, which did not appear in the files. For example, there are 
couples with repeat incidents in the data set, but attempts to take account 
of these multiple incidents (each of which appears as a separate case) 
proved fruitless.6 Ultimately, the sign of the coefficient may simply be 
due to Type I error. 
The final variable in the model reflects the workload within the DDA’s 
office. Each additional case forwarded in a given week reduces the prob- 
ability of a given case being followed up by about .03. The effect is 
significant at the .05 level for a one-tailed test, and the impact of additional 
cases is rather small. However, with an average caseload of approximately 
seven cases (see Table I), one additional case over the average would 
experience a reduction in probability of about .24. One case more would 
experience a reduction of about .28, and so on. Evaluations of the Santa 
Barbara Family Violence Program demonstrated that increasing the number 
of cases forwarded, as well as the quality of their documentation, had 
virtually no impact on the number of offenders sanctioned by the District 
Attorney’s office (Berk er al., 1980; Berk et al., 1982): there seemed to 
already be a sufficient number of adequately documented cases to keep 
the special DDA busy. That interpretation is consistent with the findings 
here, and it seems inconsistent with Heumann’s (1977) argument that 
caseload pressures have been grossly overstated. 
With the exception of the racial effect, these results for the follow-up 
decision are as expected. The DDA will follow up better documented 
and more serious cases because these cases maximize her utility. There 
is a clear indication in the coefficients for male and female character, 
married couples, and for injured offenders, that the DDA has some 
notions of what domestic cases should or should not be, or which domestic 
cases can or cannot be followed up, holding constant relevant legal 
criteria. As we shall see, these notions, or typifications, become especially 
important later, when possible sanctions are considered (i.e., diversion). 
One variable that I also considered, and thought would play a role, 
is the age of the victim. Older victims might be thought of as less credible, 
6 I used dummy variables for the repeat incidents, in each of the three equations, but 
the variables were not significant. These dummy variables, had they worked, would have 
also controlled for possible correlations among the residuals for the repeat couples. 
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especially if their age was an indication of the length of the relationship. 
For whatever reasons, because the variable is not important, or because 
it does not measure very well the length of the relationship, age had 
absolutely no impact on the follow-up decision. Largely because of mea- 
surement problems (due to missing data problems), I dropped it from 
the analysis. 
Recalling Myers and Hagan’s (1979) argument that strong cases are 
described in legally relevant terms, I also examined a variety of interactions 
between the indices for victim, offender, and situation characteristics 
and a variety of other variables. The rationale was that if descriptions 
of strong cases (based on legal criteria) differed from descriptions of 
weaker cases, as Myers and Hagan indicate, cases with good and/or bad 
characteristics along various dimensions might also be handled in different 
ways. For example, if the victim was severely injured, other, more 
positive case features may be viewed more negatively as a result. I tried 
a variety of configurations, in an admittedly exploratory fashion, but 
there was no consistent pattern in terms of statistical significance, nor 
even in terms of coefficients’ signs. Collinearity with other variables and 
lack of variance in the interaction terms are the most likely explanations 
for this inability to explain very much, and therefore I do not report any 
of these results. 
The Decision to File Charges 
In contrast to the results for the follow-up decision, the findings for 
the arraignment decision, reported in Table 3, are virtually nonexistent. 
The two most striking results are puzzling at best: the severity of the 
victim’s injuries reduces the probability of charges being filed; injuries 
to the offender increase the probability of charges being filed. Of the 
remaining substantive coefficients, only that for the offender’s prior record 
is significant, and unlike the coefficients for injuries, it is in the predicted 
direction (positive). I again tried a variety of interaction terms, similar 
to those tested in the first equation, but the results were altogether 
disappointing. As before, there was no consistent pattern, and there were 
certainly no effects that dramatically improved the overall story. Here 
too, I will not report these efforts. 
Rather than spend time attempting to interpret the findings individually, 
I feel that a simple account is available for the model as a whole. If one 
looks at the number of cases that are forwarded to the next step (i.e., 
charges could be filed and therefore a decision about diversion must be 
made), fully 78% of the cases that are followed up either result in diversion 
or arraignment. In other words, the decision to initially allocate resources 
(follow up a case) is, for the vast majority of cases, effectively a decision 
to prosecute. It may be that largely idiosyncratic factors cause cases to 
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TABLE 3 
A Probit Model for Whether or not Charges May Be Filed (N = 96) 
Variable Coefficient Asymptotic t value 
Intercept -0.180 -0.43 
The offender was arrested for bat- 
tery = I (binary) 
Female character: the number of 
negative circumstances (integers) 
Male character: the number of nega- 
tive circumstances (integers) 










The number of pieces of evidence 
(integers) 0.109 




The offender’s number of prior 
crime charges (integers) 
The victim and the offender are 
married = 1 (binary) 
The victim and the offender are 
nonwhite = 1 (binary) 
Hazard rate instrument” 





n Calculated with the predicted probabilities from the equation for whether or not a case 
is followed up. 
b See Table 2 for the formula used to calculate R'. 
fall apart after the first decision to follow them up. Put a bit differently, 
as more information becomes available for a particular case, the DDA’s 
initial assessment of the case and the likelihood of successful prosecution 
may change. For example, self-inflicted injuries to the offender may 
become known after a criminal investigator is sent out to collect evidence 
and discover other details of the incident. A second explanation, which 
does not preclude the first, is that the DDA may be looking ahead to 
the next step and keeping borderline cases alive in order to utilize the 
diversion option. If so, the first decision becomes all the more crucial, 
since that is where the DDA is choosing to maximize her utility with 
respect to prosecution. And having made the initial decision to follow 
up, the DDA is perhaps reluctant to drop the case altogether. As Myers 
and Hagan (1979) have pointed out, the initial decision to follow up is 
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a decision to allocate resources; if a diversion option is available, resources 
do not necessarily have to be lost when a case begins to unravel.’ 
The Decision to Divert 
The findings for the third model, whether or not an offender is diverted 
from prosecution, are reported in Table 4. One can now begin to see 
emerging an overall logic to the DDA’s decision making across the three 
decision stages. Diversion is apparently an alternative sanction for cases 
that might be weak, or for which counseling would be the outcome 
anyway, regardless of the offender’s suitability for diversion. My suspicions 
were that the diversion criteria were being applied, but that for certain 
offenders these criteria were being loosened. As becomes clear with this 
model, the DDA may have had appropriate courses of action in mind 
from the very start. 
Recall that the criteria for diversion include the following, for which 
I have measures: the offender has not been convicted of a domestic 
violence offense, the victim’s injuries are not serious, and the offender 
has no significant criminal record.* In addition, three criteria for which 
I do not have measures are an offender’s judged responsibility, an offender’s 
desire for diversion, and a victim’s objections, if any, to diversion. In 
principle, only these factors should affect the decision to divert; presumably 
other matters such as the weight of evidence and organizational demands 
have already been considered before or at the decision that charges can 
be filed. 
The results in Table 4 indicate that factors other than the three measured 
criteria have a role in the decision-making process. The severity of the 
victim’s injuries appears to have little bearing on the decision to divert. 
The coefficient is negative as expected, but it is not statistically significant. 
However, prior record does make a difference, with each additional prior 
crime charge significantly reducing the probability of diversion by about 
.17. Since, for most offenders, the range of the variable is 0 to 2 (but 
several offenders have more), the maximum effect is a reduction in the 
probability of .34. This is a moderate effect, but when viewed alongside 
’ I also specified a two-equation model, dropping the second equation and estimating 
the diversion equation with the larger sample. My reasoning was that if the follow-up 
decision was a decision to prosecute, and only idiosyncratic factors forced cases out later, 
the larger sample was effectively the pool from which diversion cases were selected. The 
results were nearly identical to those for the reported third equation, except that the t 
statistics were uniformly lower. The larger sample merely adds more observations with 
zero values for the dependent variable, and no extra explanatory power was to be had. 
’ Significant criminal record is not defined specifrcahy in the Family Violence Prosecutor’s 
Manual. The DDA therefore has the discretion of deciding what significant means. If there 
was more variance in criminal records (most offenders had none or one prior charge), I 
could explore how prior record is used to relate particular cases to the DDA’s ideas of 
what domestic cases typically involve (see Sudnow, 1964). 
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TABLE 4 
A Probit Model for Whether or not a Case Is Diverted (N = 75) 
Variable Coefficient Asymptotic t value 
Intercept -0.960 -0.78 
The offender was arrested for bat- 
tery = 1 (binary) 
Female character: the number of 
negative circumstances (integers) 
Male character: the number of nega- 
tive circumstances (integers) 




-1.439 - 1.62 
-0.332 - 1.25 
The offender was injured = 1 
(binary) 1.024 0.85 
The number of pieces of evidence 
(integers) - 0.296 -0.78 
The victim will not cooperate = 1 
(binary) 2.051 2.22 
The offender’s number of prior 
criminal charges (integers) 
The victim and the offender are 
married = 1 (binary) 
The victim and the offender are 
nonwhite = 1 (binary) 
Hazard rate instrument” 
R' = .4@ 
-0.421 -2.05 
1.154 1.99 
- 0.402 -0.43 
-0.066 -0.06 
c/ Calculated with the predicted probabilities from the equation for whether or not charges 
may be filed. 
b See Table 2 for the formula used to calculate R'. 
the null effect for the victim’s injuries, is not what one would expect if 
the diversion requirements were being strictly applied. According to the 
program requirements, a record should strongly reduce the chances of 
ending up in diversion, just as severe injuries should. However, since 
very few of the offenders who reached this stage had prior charges for 
domestic incidents, I have included all charges in a single variable. Con- 
sequently, the prior crime charges may represent a “watered down” 
effect. 
The coefficient for the other measure of the severity of the incident, 
an arrest on battery charges (a misdemeanor), is not statistically significant 
since I expected a negative effect. I used this variable here (and in the 
second equation) rather than the arrest variable from the first equation 
because of the large proportion of offenders who were arrested. Arrest 
was such a strong predictor and so highly collinear with other variables 
after the follow-up decision, that it impaired the models for the second 
and third stages. However, since almost half of all arrests were on battery 
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charges, the alternative specification represents the most common arrest 
situation. Furthermore, battery is a personal violence charge, albeit a 
misdemeanor charge, and that fact should lessen the probability of ending 
up in counseling. And since the vast majority of arrests in the sample 
were on misdemeanor charges, it is hard to argue that battery is less 
severe when compared to other cases. In retrospect, it is easy to see 
why a positive effect is consistent with my overall expectations about 
prosecutor decision making. Offenders arrested on battery charges are, 
in effect, being sanctioned at this stage: conviction for battery typically 
involves probation and counseling anyway (for first-time offenders cer- 
tainly). As a consequence, I am inclined to take the coefficient’s sign 
seriously rather than attributing it solely to Type I error. 
One of the important elements affecting a prosecutor’s decisions is 
the desirable outcome (e.g., Sudnow, 1964). Whereas in earlier stages, 
going on to the next step meant for the victim increasingly closer scrutiny, 
and for the offender an increased likelihood of sanctions, diversion rep- 
resents an easier option for the victim and a more lenient “punishment” 
for the offender. As expected, each additional negative aspect of the 
victim’s character-drinking and alleged violence-now significantly in- 
creases the probability of diversion by about .83, while each additional 
negative aspect of the offender’s character now significantly decreases 
the likelihood of counseling by about .58. The model for the follow-up 
decision showed that offenders married to their victims were less likely 
to continue in the system. Here, I find that married couples are more 
likely to be diverted, and the effect is significant at the .05 level for a 
one-tailed test. Married women are possibly viewed as having more to 
lose if the offender is prosecuted; in terms of the victim, prosecution 
may be the least desirable outcome. Given that they have entered the 
system, offenders married to their victims are more likely to end up in 
counseling, perhaps because the DDA is reluctant to prosecute the husband, 
or perhaps because counseling is seen as having a better chance of 
“helping” couples with an established relationship. In addition, if the 
victim has stated that she will not cooperate with prosecution efforts, 
there is a large and statistically significant increase in the probability of 
diversion of about .82. If the case will be difficult to prosecute because 
of the victim’s noncooperation, diversion is a way of keeping the offender 
under control with the threat of prosecution. 
As expected, there is no effect for evidence, nor are there effects for 
nonwhite couples, nor for injuries to the offender. The variable representing 
evidence in the second and third equations is an index constructed as 
the sum of the index from the first equation and the number of the 
following characteristics: hospital reports documenting the victim’s injuries, 
photos of the victim’s injuries, other physical evidence, and witnesses 
to the incident other than the police. 
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In terms of the DDA’s utility function, good cases maximize utility, 
and I strongly suspect (based on field observations)’ that, at the time of 
the decision to file charges, there may have been anticipation of the 
diversion option. This is certainly a conclusion that one could draw from 
the combined results of the second and third equations. The formal 
criteria for diversion have little impact on the diversion decision, but 
other criteria, more relevant to the construction of a good case and the 
likely outcome generally do play a role: the charges the offender was 
arrested on, the character of both the victim and the offender, and the 
victim’s unwillingness to cooperate. Cases that were originally considered 
borderline may have been carried along with the intent of diverting them 
later. In the latter two equations, Heckman’s hazard rate instruments 
are essentially proxies for measures of the DDA’s intent, and in this 
context, one can give an interpretation to the positive and statistically 
significant (for a two-tailed test) hazard rate instrument in the second 
equation. Since the hazard rate measures the likelihood of not remaining 
in the selected sample, the positive effect indicates that “high risk” 
cases at the first decision are more likely to be moved along at the 
arraignment decision as well. The hazard rate instrument in the third 
equation is not statistically significant, but this probably reflects the 
inability to explain very much in the second equation, one result of which 
is a weak instrument. In addition, dropping the hazard rate instruments 
from the latter two equations has little substantive impact on either 
model. The second equation is weak to begin with, and therefore dropping 
the instrument can do little to affect it. The instrument constructed from 
the second equation is itself weak, and its role as an explanatory variable 
in the third equation is minor at best. 
It is also important to remember that the sample size of 75 at the final 
stage makes the estimated equation particularly vulnerable to data problems 
of all sorts. My attempts to include interaction terms in the third equation 
were as fruitless as those for earlier equations, and the small sample 
size apparently exacerbated lack of variance problems. However, on the 
positive side, model estimates at all three steps were remarkably stable 
for a variety of specifications (recall the model building strategy). While 
there are anomolies, there is a fairly consistent pattern in the data, leading 
to a reasonable substantive account of the DDA’s decision-making strategy. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis of the decision-making process within the special DDA’s 
office in Santa Barbara largely confirms my expectations, with some 
important additions. The criteria used to make early screening decisions 
involve more than what would be admissible in a courtroom. In particular, 
9 Donileen R. Loseke conducted the field research component of this study. 
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decisions made before a case might go to trial afford an opportunity for 
a variety of mitigating circumstances to be taken into account. To char- 
acterize this process in terms of the random utility model, the DDA 
screens out bad cases early, and makes use of the criminal investigator 
to gather more information about the other, especially borderline cases. 
Good cases have good victims and bad offenders, sufficient evidence, 
and are serious enough to warrant attention from authorities. Given her 
knowledge and experience about what good and bad cases are, and the 
legal and organizational constraints placed upon her, the DDA chose to 
maximize her utility (which includes efficient use of the criminal inves- 
tigator) at the first step. Any dropping of cases at later points is apparently 
due to unique features of the individual cases. With an available diversion 
option, the DDA can keep certain cases alive that would otherwise be 
dropped; they can now be diverted. There is nothing in the criteria for 
diversion that contradicts the legal or “extralegal” criteria for a good 
case. In fact, they both compliment and extend the definition of a good 
case. Thus, diversion into counseling is yet another available sanction, 
less severe than either probation or prosecution, which allows the DDA 
to retain control through the threat of future prosecution. 
Does this mean that the diversion program was not used as intended? 
The answer is that its use was apparently expanded beyond the formally 
stated intent. I have no evidence that qualified offenders were denied 
counseling, but other, perhaps formally unqualified offenders may have 
been diverted. If the DDA’s mandate to prosecute family violence cases 
is broadly construed, as my analyses suggest that it was, then retaining 
control over offenders whose cases might otherwise be dismissed is 
consistent with that mandate. And diverting weak cases is certainly 
consistent with other organizational goals such as quick and successful 
processing of cases. At the same time, field observations indicate that 
counseling resources were taxed by this extraordinary use of the program, 
perhaps undermining the intent of providing counseling to a certain class 
of domestic violence offenders. 
The question remains, however, does this use of “extralegal” criteria 
constitute discriminatory behavior on the part of the DDA? As Nagel 
(1983) has argued, one must look at the relative weight of legal and 
extralegal factors in a given situation, as well as the outcome. Looking 
solely at the outcome, I would not argue that the Santa Barbara DDA 
acted in a discriminatory or unjust manner by paying attention to other- 
than-legally defined criteria in her decision making. Given organizational 
pressures for the “good case,” as well as a finite set of resources, the 
DDA was able to prosecute a certain number of wife batterers and bring 
a few more under the control of authorities through the counseling option. 
And since the impact of extra-legal factors varied by decision, it is 
virtually impossible to maintain that if discrimination against certain 
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groups was a feature of the DDA’s decision making, it was practiced in 
any consistent manner. The usual picture brought to mind by claims of 
discrimination is one of single-minded intent that will not be context 
specific (see the remarks by Martin and Roy in the opening paragraph 
of this article). This is not what the findings of my analyses show. 
And more generally, in situations where gender, racial, or other types 
of discrimination are at issue, one cannot simply assume that extra-legal 
considerations are inappropriate, or that they are not in some way pros- 
cribed by case law (Nagel, 1983). As I have done here, the specific 
context of decision making has to be examined, as do the outcomes. 
Future research should concentrate on the interplay between organizational 
demands and the details of individual cases, and how that interplay leads 
ultimately to particular decisions (see Messinger, Berecochea, Rauma, 
and Berk, in press, for an example). Only then, by considering what and 
how various outcomes were achieved, can decisions made by judges, 
prosecutors, and other criminal justice officials be better understood. 
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